


National Situation Report for 2025/2

Blackout
Pandemic
Religiously motivated extremism



Imprint

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Federal Chancellery Republic of Austria, Office of Crisis Management
Ballhausplatz 2, 1010 Wien
+43 1 531 15-0
bueroksb@bka.gv.at
bundeskanzleramt.gv.at
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Dear Reader,

I am pleased to present the second Austrian National Strategic Situation Report. In contrast to the first Report, which provided a 360-degree overview of Austria's resilience and crisis preparedness, this Report focuses on three topics, chosen for their relevance and topicality: blackout, a new pandemic caused by a respiratory pathogen, and religiously motivated extremism.

The central message of this Situation Report is as simple as it is challenging to implement: preparedness is key to success. We cannot predict with any certainty when or how a blackout or a new pandemic will occur. We can and must, however, prepare for such situations. Because who prepares remains capable of action. Anything else would be grossly negligent, given the potential consequences.

Preparedness means more than just plans and checklists. It includes a shared understanding of the risks, a careful analysis of dependencies, the strengthening of redundancies and reserves, the practising of procedures in realistic scenarios, and the creation of the necessary legal framework. Preparation requires the willingness to learn from past events, to address weaknesses openly, and to remedy them in a structured manner, even where this may be inconvenient.

Different though religiously motivated extremism may be from the phenomena of blackouts and pandemics, many of the preparatory measures mentioned are also of central importance in defending against this phenomenon: first and foremost, a common, whole-of-nation understanding of the risks posed by the phenomenon. Subversive infiltration by extremism does not produce an immediate effect, as would be the case with a blackout. Rather, its effects unfold gradually and often below the threshold of perception, to the point where irreparable damage has already been done.

I do not use these words because Austria is inadequately prepared. Quite the contrary: I use them because a great deal of preparations has already been made in Austria. Numerous individual initiatives, a multitude of good concepts, and a high level of commitment are already in place. What is still missing, however—and without this final element, all other preparations cannot fulfil their potential—is a whole-of-government umbrella under which these efforts must be united.

This does not mean concentrating everything in one hand or in one ministry—rather, it is about a common framework, a common standard of quality, to lift the preparations for these challenges to a common level. This integrated approach, this common mosaic of crisis management, should be our goal.



Dr Peter Vorhofer

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to everyone involved in the compilation of this Report. I am fully aware that for many of you this was an additional burden on top of your already demanding workload. I can assure you that your input represents an invaluable contribution to increasing Austria's national security and whole-of-nation resilience.

Dr Peter Vorhofer

Advisor to the Federal Government in matters pertaining to National Security, National Resilience, Comprehensive National Defence, Crisis Preparedness and Crisis Management

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Normative foundations

The Federal Crisis Security Act (*Bundes-Krisensicherheitsgesetz*) came into force on 1 January 2024. This Act comprehensively advanced the whole-of-government coordination of national security and whole-of-government crisis management. The purpose of the Act is to ensure national security and resilience through stronger networking and cooperation between all stakeholders in the face of new and complex challenges. Newly created structures and processes are intended to improve coordination between, and make more efficient use of, the expertise and capabilities of the various ministries. In addition, the Federal Crisis Security Act provides, for the first time, a legal definition of the term “crisis” as well as specific procedures for the definition of crises.

Pursuant to the Federal Crisis Security Act, the structures are headed by the Advisor to the Federal Government in matters pertaining to National Security, National Resilience, Comprehensive National Defence, Crisis Preparedness and Crisis Management (*Berater der Bundesregierung für nationale Sicherheit, staatliche Resilienz, umfassende Landesverteidigung, Krisenvorsorge und Krisenbewältigung*), as well as his or her deputy. They are supported by the Office of Crisis Management (*Krisensicherheitsbüro*) located in the Federal Chancellery. Austria thus follows international best practice. Comparable structures exist, *inter alia*, in the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. Germany also followed this trend in the summer of 2025 and introduced structures similar to the Federal Crisis Security Act.

Advice to the Federal Government is provided on the basis of, *inter alia*, a semi-annual national strategic situation report. It is generated periodically and holistically based on individual situation reports pertaining to the areas of security, health, energy, climate and the environment, the economy, intelligence developments, and defence policy. However, it also employs a topic-centred approach to deal with focus areas, using ministerial expertise as well as that of other relevant actors where appropriate, in a whole-of-nation strategic approach.

The present Situation Report was created taking a topic-focused approach.

Methodology

In contrast to the first Report, which provided a 360-degree overview of Austria's resilience and crisis preparedness, the present National Situation Report 2025/2 analyses—three focus areas: a blackout, a pandemic caused by a respiratory pathogen, and religiously motivated extremism. Due to their similarities regarding crisis preparedness, the focus areas of blackout and pandemic were considered together and analysed using a common methodology. The focus area of religiously motivated extremism was dealt with using a separate methodology due to its sensitive content and the phenomenon's fundamentally different nature.

This document presents the results of the analyses of all three focus areas. The current section of the paper offers explanations of the methodology used for the topics of blackout and pandemic, as well as explanations of the approach taken in the focus area of religiously motivated extremism.

Blackout and pandemic

For the analysis of the focus areas of blackout and pandemic, a methodological link to the EU's Preparedness Union Strategy (published on 26 March 2025) was chosen. The relevant statements in the Report were used to derive indicators which can be employed to measure Austria's crisis preparedness capabilities regarding these scenarios. The indicators used are as follows:

1. crisis response coordination
2. forecasting and anticipation
3. protection of essential societal functions
4. public preparedness
5. public-private cooperation
6. civil-military cooperation
7. legal situation specific to Austria with regard to crisis preparedness

Court of Auditors reports, EU regulations, and findings derived from the COVID-19 pandemic and the blackout on the Iberian Peninsula on 28 April 2025 were also used as points of reference to determine these capabilities.

A three-step process was chosen to analyse these two focus areas: illustration of the status quo in terms of the indicators for blackouts and pandemics, derivations regarding the status quo compared with the aforementioned points of reference, and development of whole-of-government options for action based on the conclusions reached in order to achieve the objectives of the EU strategy for a resilient Union.

Religiously motivated extremism

Religiously motivated extremism is a particularly dangerous phenomenon with ramifications for many societal and governmental sectors, and the potential to cause incalculable harm. This means that the creation of a situation report pertaining to this topic entails a number of methodological challenges.

The first of which is the lack of a uniform legal definition of the term “extremism” which encompasses this phenomenon in all its potential effects. The term is often used to describe political endeavours which openly oppose the norms and rules of the constitutional state. This definition also usually comprises the use of violence as a legitimate means to achieve individual objectives.

However, any situation report with a claim to meeting the requirements of a whole-of-government approach must also take into account forms of religiously motivated extremism which exert an influence in a subtle, subversive manner and within legal grey areas. This occurs over a longer period, if necessary over years or decades, in order to achieve changes in line with its agenda. This characteristic means that the phenomenon must be understood as a hybrid threat to democratic rule of law.

In order to do justice to the whole-of-nation relevance of this Situation Report, the broadest possible approach was taken in defining the term “extremism” which is in accordance with prevalent scientific and administrative interpretations, and furthermore attempts to include the above-mentioned subliminal effects of the phenomenon.

Due to the sensitive nature of its content, specific details regarding the methodology used in this focus area of the Situation Report cannot be made public.

Summary

The following is a summary of the crisis preparedness status quo in the fields of a blackout and pandemic caused by a respiratory pathogen, as well as a summary of the findings derived from the analyses in the area of religiously motivated extremism.

Blackout

A blackout can occur when there is an imbalance in the power grid. If there are unexpected and severe fluctuations, for example due to localised high power consumption, the grid can collapse. Such large-scale power outages can be caused e.g. by natural disasters, physical attacks, or extreme weather conditions resulting from gale-force winds, thunderstorms, or heavy snowfall.

The occurrence of a blackout cannot be predicted. Its probability is estimated at a rate of once every 30 to 100 years and therefore considered unlikely, although the potential consequences in the event of an occurrence are considered to be extremely serious.

In the event of a blackout, the Austrian economy is estimated to suffer losses of € 1 billion per day. Appropriate compensation through government or business measures would have to be assured.

Based on simulations and crisis exercises, Austrian Power Grid AG (APG) assumes that it would be able to restore the power grid to normal operating conditions within 10 to 24 hours after a blackout, thereby restoring a secure power supply. In severe cases, returning to normal operating conditions might take considerably longer. A new technological process involving swarm storage makes it possible to balance out power fluctuations and stabilise the grid.

In the event of a blackout, it is particularly important to conduct a rapid first analysis and initiate measures quickly. All ministries need to determine the services and procedures regarding core and emergency operations. This forms the basis for planning all organisational, personnel, technical, and logistical measures regarding blackout preparedness. In the preparation phase, there should be a structured process concerning the development of plannable fundamentals, because the blackout scenario can be clearly outlined and its effects are predictable.

In general, most ministries have focused on improving internal coordination for crisis response. For example, central staff units have been designated within the National Crisis and Disaster Management (*Staatliches Krisen- und Katastrophenmanagement*) to ensure, inter alia, 24/7 on-call duty and central coordination.

Various ministries have also developed crisis manuals to ensure initial procedures. It was important to share emergency contact details in order to speed up and ensure communication, especially in the early stages of a blackout.

In the event of a failure of regular communications, digital radio serves as the first redundancy level in Austria. To ensure communication, BOS radio devices have been purchased by the federal ministries and gradually integrated into the digital radio network.

In addition to state institutions, there are also plans to work with stakeholders to increase and improve crisis response in the event of a blackout.

Maintaining as much of the national transport infrastructure as possible is particularly important in the event of a blackout. However, this cannot be guaranteed in all areas within the first 48 hours. It is therefore very important to plan for reduced or emergency operations, as large sections of the population may be affected.

Planning for a blackout scenario can only work if everyone is sufficiently prepared to be self-sufficient to a certain extent and, in particular, if personnel critical to the system prepare their households and family environments to such an extent that they can actually report for duty in the event of a blackout.

It has repeatedly been observed that critical infrastructure operators as well as civil society actors hold a distorted view of the state's ability to provide services (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Ministry of Defence) and that the relinquishment of personal responsibility exceeds the state's capacity to provide services.

Across Europe, some countries are publicly discussing and officially promoting a minimum period of 72 hours of self-sufficiency for the population. From a whole-of-nation perspective, the goal must be to ensure that the population can sustain itself for one week. Eight out of ten people in Austria (79.5%) have already made some form of provision for a blackout (according to a recent survey of 1,000 people aged between 18 and 65).¹

Pandemic

The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that respiratory pathogens can spread rapidly among the population and push the healthcare system to its limits. A pandemic has a knock-on effect on the labour market, the economy, our society, and social cohesion. With this in mind, strategic crisis preparedness must consider all these areas equally.

¹ cf. Exkurs Umfrage Österreichischer Zivilschutzverband (Indikator 2: Vorausschau und Antizipation).

In the event of a pandemic, the Federal Crisis Security Act (*Bundes-Krisensicherheitsgesetz*) and National Crisis and Disaster Management (*Staatliches Krisen- und Katastrophenschutzmanagement*) ensure the coordination of crisis response and management at the national level. The Epidemic Act (*Epidemiegesetz*), which is currently being revised based on experience gained in the COVID-19 pandemic, is crucial for pandemic management. Key factors in pandemic management are set out in the Pandemic Plan (*Pandemieplan*), which reflects experience gained in the COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has improved the crisis response capabilities of many ministries (crisis staffs and departments, crisis plans) and has thus increased whole-of-government response capabilities. Communication is a key factor in successfully combating a pandemic, as there is a strong correlation between the communication of protective measures and the containment of infection. A whole-of-government communication strategy is recommended. This should not only apply to pandemics, but to crises of all kinds.

The incidence of notifiable diseases is monitored by the Epidemiological Reporting System (*Epidemiologisches Meldesystem*), which should be adapted and further developed to meet the requirements of a pandemic. Several surveillance programmes have been created since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic to monitor non-notifiable respiratory infectious diseases (Severe Acute Respiratory Infections (SARI-Dashboard, wastewater monitoring, reference centre for viral pathogens). Together, they form a type of early warning system, which should be standardised and further expanded. At the European and international level, the monitoring of serious cross-border health threats is ensured through exchanges in committees etc., and through various notification requirements.

The APCIP (Austrian Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection) Master Plan 2014 provides a national strategy for the protection of essential societal functions. Accordingly, preparatory and awareness-raising measures are continuously implemented together with the operators of critical infrastructure. In addition, further prevention, preparedness, and mitigation measures are in place in certain sectors in the event of a crisis. Other sectors, in turn, specify the requirements of the health authorities for their own area. The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has made the respective sectors more aware of the possibility of new pandemics and other crises. Cooperation between authorities and operators should be further strengthened and the number of National Crisis and Disaster Management exercises should be increased. Legal certainty and mandatory measures to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure operators are pursued with the Critical Entities Resilience Act (*Resilienz kritischer Einrichtungen-Gesetz*).

The supply of critical goods must be ensured also during a pandemic, and the production capacity of Austrian companies must be maintained. If the food supply is affected in the course of a pandemic, the provisions of the Food Supply Management Act (*Lebensmittelbewirtschaftungsgesetz*) will be applied. Austria is heavily dependent on third countries for the production and delivery of important healthcare goods. Since the beginning of

the COVID-19 pandemic, measures have been taken to ensure the supply of medicines even during delivery bottlenecks (Delivery Bottlenecks Task Force – Task-Force Lieferengpässe, Distribution Restrictions Register – Vertriebsbeschränkungen-Register, parallel export ban, various ordinances). This capacity must be maintained and whole-of-nation autonomy (stockpiling and production capacity) strengthened.

In Austria, public preparedness for a pandemic can be viewed as part of civil protection, as is the case for other crises and disasters. Authorities, organisations, companies, and institutions can and should therefore communicate information on preventive measures relating to health and pandemics through their channels within their remits. A high level of health literacy among the population can significantly contribute to the reduction of health effects and the bolstering of social resilience and should therefore be further strengthened at all levels. Immunisation is one of the most important preventive measures to reduce or even avoid (communicable) diseases and their consequences. The expansion of free vaccination programmes should therefore be continued.

Public-private cooperation is particularly important in the event of a pandemic, especially with regard to the availability of medical supplies. Not least due to the experience gained during the COVID-19 pandemic, efforts are made at an international level to strengthen public-private cooperation (WHO Pandemic Agreement). Efforts at a European level to secure Europe as a production centre and ensure the supply of essential medicines must be continued. In this, Austrian capacities should be earmarked as a strategic contribution.

In the event of a pandemic, civil-military cooperation becomes an essential element of the response measures. The Austrian Armed Forces' contribution to protecting livelihoods is clearly set out in the Austrian Security Strategy (*Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie*). A further need arises indirectly through the protection of the critical infrastructure serving as the framework for pandemic management. A further strengthening of cooperation, whilst taking into account the primary tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces, is recommended. At a European level, a number of initiatives have already been launched to increase resilience, including with regard to cross-border health threats. This may also result in the involvement of the Austrian Armed Forces.

Religiously motivated extremism

Religiously motivated extremism poses a continued threat and a security policy and societal challenge to the democratic rule of law. It primarily originates from groups within the major monotheistic faiths who regard values such as diversity and equality as incompatible with their religious beliefs and therefore reject them.

Religiously motivated extremism in Austria manifests itself primarily in Political Islam, which poses the greatest threat in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The term describes an Islamic ideology of oppression which seeks to transform or influence society,

culture, the state, or politics, and negates the values of the democratic rule of law as well as fundamental rights and freedoms. Muslims who practise their religion without any intention of transforming our state are therefore explicitly not to be classified as part of Political Islam.

Political Islam can essentially be divided into two groups: The first group comprises individuals who are prepared to use violence, openly espouse a dichotomous worldview ('us against them' or 'believers against unbelievers') and aim to abolish the rule of law and replace it with Sharia law ('hard power' Islamism). The second group includes those who seek to advance an Islamist agenda in liberal societies through legal and political measures and to effect a subversive democratic infiltration of constitutional structures ('soft power' Islamism).

Particularly in the area of 'soft power' Islamism, the actors usually operate unnoticed due to their adherence to the law. By ostensibly making legitimate use of democratic freedoms and constitutional processes and instruments, they attempt to undermine the state from within. This approach must therefore be regarded as a hybrid threat, which can only be countered by the state through early preventive measures.

Compared with the overall threat posed by Political Islam, Christian extremism in Austria is manageable in terms of both quality and quantity. Nevertheless, developments in this area must also be monitored closely.

When assessing the risk potential, a clear distinction must be made between the mere practice of religion or religiously motivated participation in society and the intention to undermine democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as attitudes and actions violating fundamental and human rights based on religious norms which threaten the self-determination of third parties.

Options for action at the national level

The following options for action at the national level are derived from the Situation Report findings listed above. Implementing these options for action could significantly contribute to further increasing national security and state resilience. This chapter is again divided thematically between power blackout and pandemic on the one hand and religiously motivated extremism on the other. The options for action at the national level in the areas of blackouts and pandemics are further subdivided according to their relevance to the indicators described above, which were derived from the EU's *Preparedness Union Strategy*.

Blackout and pandemic

Crisis response coordination

Blackout

1. Development of a national blackout strategy (short-term option for action) and a federal resilience plan, including the integration of all current risks in the civil sector (long-term option for action).
2. Establishment of a national basic radio network which closes existing gaps in the radio network for public authorities, which is not yet fully operational (e.g., fibre optic concept, satellite concept, radio mast concept).
3. Continuation of practical tests of blackout scenarios at the whole-of-nation level and further expansion of communication capabilities. Selected critical infrastructure and other relevant agencies must subsequently be included in this communication concept.

Pandemic

4. Revision of the existing *Pandemic Plan for Respiratory Diseases* based on the findings of the Public Health Emergency Assessment (PHEPA) and taking into account the newly created national structures in accordance with the Federal Crisis Security Act (*Bundes-Krisensicherheitsgesetz*).

Forecast and anticipation

Blackout

5. Proactive creation of IT blackout plans for core administrative areas and precautionary measures for the failure of digital IT processes, including accompanying legislative measures to ensure that administrative processes can also be carried out in analogue form, if necessary.
6. Galileo Early Warning Satellite Service: Cooperation between the Federal Ministry of Innovation, Mobility and Infrastructure, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the federal provinces is necessary for further implementation. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior's ability to inform the population in the event of a crisis (AT-Alert) should be extended to other ministries. This requires

an extension of competence pursuant to Section 125 (1), Telecommunications Act (*Telekommunikationsgesetz*).

7. Adoption of the Federal Act on Emergency Measures for Federal Highways – Federal Highway Emergency Act (*Bundesgesetzes über Notfallmaßnahmen für Bundesstraßen – Bundesstraßennotfallgesetz*).

Pandemic

8. Maintaining existing wastewater monitoring for SARS-CoV-2, influenza, and RSV (Respiratory Syncytial Virus), and establishing monitoring in private practices similar to the SARI (Severe Acute Respiratory Infections) Dashboard. The information derived from the various monitoring methods for respiratory pathogens should be combined on a publicly accessible information page in the form of a digital early warning dashboard, including regular risk assessments and recommendations on possible protective measures for the population, especially before and during waves of infection.
9. Full implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organisation in Austria.

Protection of basic societal functions

Blackout

10. Reviewing a closer involvement of the Austrian mail service (Post AG) in crisis situations.²

Pandemic

11. Consideration of the provisions of the new Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Act (RKEG) in the Austrian Program for Critical Infrastructure (APCIP 2014).
12. Conducting a structured risk analysis of critical raw materials with regard to biocides (disinfectants) and their stockpiling, as well as assessing the need for disinfectants in critical infrastructures.

Public preparedness

Blackout

13. Continuation of nationwide, sequential, multi-year information campaigns for the population on crisis preparedness.
14. Expansion or continuation of support instruments to increase resilience of rural infrastructure (emergency power generators, photovoltaic systems) and establishment of a similar programme for urban areas.

2 This would require an amendment to the Postal Market Act (*Postmarktgesetz*) in order to be able to call on Austrian Post AG for support in a blackout scenario (e.g., delivery of urgently needed food or medication to people who are unable to travel). Any obligation of Austrian PostAG to cooperate would have to be enshrined in the Postal Market Act (*Postmarktgesetz*), and the costs would have to be covered by the federal government.

15. Introduction of an early warning system in the event of supply chain disruptions, taking into account the findings of the Supply Chain Intelligence Institute Austria (ASCII).
16. Continuation of integrated exercises with critical infrastructure operators, assuming a major incident such as e.g. a blackout, in order to be able to provide a realistic assessment in a blackout event.

Pandemic

17. Increasing immunisation rates among the population with regard to communicable diseases and expanding the existing range of free vaccinations based on scientific findings and a cost-benefit analysis.

Public-private cooperation

Blackout

18. Extension of written agreements (legally non-binding cooperation agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) or legally binding contracts (e.g., administrative agreements or private law contracts)) on cooperation in the event of a blackout in order to include all necessary institutions and private companies.
19. Establishment of legally binding (mutual) information obligations on the basis of experience gained in exercises and real incidents, so that these can be regularly evaluated and adapted.

Pandemic

20. Strengthening Austria and Europe as production sites for pharmaceuticals and other medical goods in order to counteract dependence on third countries.
21. Greater involvement of the business community in strategic crisis preparedness and crisis communication.

Civil-military cooperation

Blackout

22. Facilitation of investments with multiple uses that serve crisis preparedness (e.g., in the context of infrastructure).
23. Creation of a legal basis for industrial cooperation, especially for domestic procurement by the Austrian Armed Forces.

Pandemic

24. Continuation of existing efforts regarding the Joint Action Stockpile and the stockpiling strategy to be developed within this framework, development of a successor model to the federal crisis stockpile.

Austrian legal situation with regard to crisis preparedness

Blackout

25. Adoption of an amended Energy Emergency Powers Act (*Energielenkungsgesetz*) and an amended Petroleum Stockholding Act (*Erdölbevorratungsgesetz*).
26. Contingency plans have already been partially implemented in some departments. Resources and clear service instructions are required to anchor these plans in a sustainable manner, both legally and organisationally.
27. Whole-of-nation guidelines pertaining to key data on crisis preparedness planning (e.g., one week of sustainability).
28. Determining which legal requirements are not valid in the event of a declared crisis, as they are only suitable for everyday operations.
29. Amendment of the Telecommunications Act (*Telekommunikationsgesetz*) with regard to crisis scenarios (e.g., obligation to operate) and its financing.

Pandemic

30. Adoption of an amended Epidemic Act (*Epidemiegesetz*) which addresses cross-border health crises and modern epidemic law.
31. During crises, the observation, analysis, and evaluation of socio-political developments should be ensured.

Religiously motivated extremism

1. Developing a whole-of-nation strategy, as well as active participation and promotion at a European and international level, for the prevention of Islamist extremism and Political Islam, with particular emphasis on state actors and their associated organisations, as well as non-state actors, in order to prevent the subversive spread of extremist structures and networks, particularly in religious communities, education systems, care, social and health services, security authorities, legislative bodies, the judiciary, judicial and correctional institutions, administrative institutions providing basic services and critical infrastructure.
2. Viewing Political Islam as a hybrid threat.
3. Extending the control options of administrative and security authorities beyond recognised mosques.
4. Developing and analysing the potential for legislative harmonisation of the Association Act (*Vereinsgesetz*) and Islam Act (*Islamgesetz*) as well as the Religious Affairs Law (*Kultusrecht*) and the Event Law (*Veranstaltungsrecht*).
5. Evaluating Residence Law (*Aufenthaltsrecht*) and Immigration Law (*Fremdenrecht*) with regard to expulsion or entry as well as family reunification in the case of ideological and religious activity, such as preachers, influencers, and officials.
6. Reviewing the implementation of specialised courts, judges, expert witnesses, and public prosecutors (specially trained in terrorism, extremism, and religious law) to complement the measures of the Anti-Terrorism Act (*Anti-Terrorismusgesetz*) for phenomena related to extremism and religious law.

7. Re-examining the expansion of the powers of the intelligence services, with particular attention to the threat posed by religiously motivated extremism in connection with technological developments and the increased use of social platforms by extremist actors.
8. Analysing the financing networks and flows, including the distribution of public funds, to religious extremist networks and actors.
9. Developing a mandatory measures and control mechanism for administrative authorities concerning welfare, funding, and religious institutions, including childcare facilities (also private schools), with regard to political agitation, with the aim of immediately suspending funding and withdrawing all administrative approvals in the event of evidence of indoctrination or gender segregation.
10. No recognition (nostrification) of imam training abroad be it in German or in a foreign language.
11. Evaluating the expansion and standardisation of federal and provincial prevention programmes and strengthening the involvement of women in these programmes.
12. Introducing mandatory training and further training for teachers on honour-based violence to raise awareness (e.g., self-declared guardians of public morals, youth gangs, dealing with these matters in schools).
13. Maintaining and expanding Austria's participation in the implementation of EU and UN databases on Islamist propaganda and individuals posing a potential threat.

